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INTRODUCTION
During a squabble over whose turn it was at bat, eleven-year-
old Kelly Niles was punched in the back of his head by a play-
mate.' A few hours later, Kelly's father brought the child to a
hospital where he was misdiagnosed as having a concussion and
sent home.2 Unfortunately, the doctors at the hospital failed to
discover the expanding blood clot in Kelly's brain.3 Emergency
neurosurgery later saved Kelly's life, but he would never be able
to control the movement of his body again.4 Kelly was confined
to a wheelchair for the rest of his life and required the assistance
117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
"** Brooklyn Law School Class of 1998; B.A. University at Albany, 1994.
The author would like to thank Christopher C. Novak for his unending support
and encouragement.
'LoNNY SHAVELSON, A CHOSEN DEATH 113 (1995).
2 Id. at 113-14.
3 Id. Kelly had sustained a "small fracture of the skull which tore an artery
under the fracture." Niles v. San Rafael, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1st Dist. 1974).
"The resulting bleeding between the dura and the skull caused an accumulation
of clotted blood that caused severe pressure on the brain." Id. Due to the clot,
Kelly suffered irreparable brain damage. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 114.
4 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 114. After the surgery, Kelly was in a coma
for six weeks. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 114. When he finally awoke, he was
mute and unable to control the movement of his arms and legs. SHAVELSON,
supra note 1, at 114.
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of five full-time attendants.5 "He could not walk, talk, clean
himself, urinate, or make love without help.",6 Kelly's intelligence
was not impaired, but he lacked the ability to communicate without
the assistance of a computerized communication device and an
attendant.7
As Kelly aged, he began to appreciate the limitations this
malady imposed upon him.8 When Kelly was thirty-three-years-
old, twenty-two years after his accident, he decided to end his pain
by committing suicide.9 However, he lacked the capacity to end his
own life.' His family agreed to assist him on the condition that
he wait until they thought of a way in which they would not be
criminally implicated." Kelly grew impatient. 12 Eventually he
5 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 115. Kelly's family sued the doctors for
malpractice and the jury awarded him four million dollars. Niles, 116 Cal. Rptr.
at 734-35. The family also sued the city of San Rafael and the San Rafael School
District and was awarded twenty-five thousand dollars. Niles, 116 Cal. Rptr. at
734. The money was used to provide Kelly with rehabilitation training and
around the clock attendants. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 110.
6 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 110.
7 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 110. Because Kelly was mute, his family and
doctors were unsure if his intelligence had been affected by the accident.
SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 114. Kelly was trained to use an Elkomi machine
which allowed him to type words and eventually communicate with others.
SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 105. It soon became apparent that his intelligence
was not adversely affected. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 105-14.
8 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 127.
9 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 133. Kelly believed that committing suicide
was a positive act that would allow him to grow and move forward. SHAVELSON,
supra note 1, at 127. He deeply believed in an afterlife, an afterlife without a
crippled body. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 127.
10 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 127.
" SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 120-2 1. Kelly's family considered drowning
him, allowing him to accidentally choke on food, or giving him a drug overdose.
SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 120-21. However, every possible scenario they
invented would probably lead to a criminal investigation. SHAVELSON, supra note
1, at 120-21.
12 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 122. Kelly became very frustrated and angry
that his disability deprived him of the ability to kill himself. SHAVELSON, supra
note 1, at 122.
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began to starve himself.'3 On the forty-third day of Kelly's fast,
he began to vomit and the pain became overwhelming. 4 "'If you
loved me, you'd kill me,' said Kelly to anyone who approached
him. No one offered."' 5 After forty-eight days, the pain became
too much for Kelly and he quit his fast.'6 However, Kelly's desire
to die was not defeated. He would fast again and succeed in ending
his life with his mother's assistance.' 7
Kelly is not the only example of a seriously ill, non-terminal
patient who has attempted to end his or her life in order to avoid
the painful existence that was thrust upon him. Dax Cowert and his
father were unaware that they parked their car near a pipeline that
was leaking propane gas.18 When they started the car, the propane
ignited, causing an explosion that killed his father and severely
13 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 127. Kelly stopped eating on March 2, 1992.
SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 127. Kelly only ingested water and espresso,
neither of which had any nutritional value. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 127.
14 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 132.
'5 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 133.
16 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 132-33. See DEREK HUMPHRY, THE FINAL
EXIT 63 (1991) (discussing the lack of medical documentation regarding the
effects of death by starvation; some medical studies report that after an individual
has lost 20% of their body weight, usually severe indigestion occurs as well as
muscle weakness and eventually mental incapacity).
17 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 150. During his second fast, Kelly's mother,
Joan Agnes, agreed to help him die. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 148. Mrs.
Agnes decided to employ a method described in Derek Humphry's book THE
FINAL EXIT. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 142-47 (referring to HUMPHRY, supra
note 16, in which the author provides practical advice on how to commit suicide
in the least painful manner). The method required Kelly to take over-the-counter
sleeping pills and place a plastic bag over his head, with rubber bands around the
bottom of his neck. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 150. Then he had to hold the
rubber bands and plastic bag away from his neck, allowing air to enter.
SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 150. When the sleeping pills caused him to fall
asleep, his fingers let go of the rubber bands causing the bag to close tightly
around his neck. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 150. Kelly died within 30
minutes. SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 143. Mrs. Agnes practiced this method
with Kelly the night before he died to ensure the procedure was comfortable.
SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 148.
'8 EUTHANASIA - THE MORAL ISSUES 16 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.
Rosenbaum eds., 1989).
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burned Dax. 19 "For fourteen months, nurses dipped him almost
every day into a tank of Clorox solution and scrubbed his burned
skin. It took several people to hold down his atrophied, eighty-five-
pound body during the tankings. ' '20 Both of his hands were
amputated, his eyes were removed, his nostrils, lips and eyelids
burned off.2' "The scars and skin graphs are a multicolored quilt
of ribbed and twisted, stretched and puffed, patched-together bits
of skin., 22 Throughout this process, Dax begged for someone to
let him die.
Both Kelly and Dax are examples of seriously ill, non-terminal
individuals. They must rely on other people to perform the most
basic tasks. Their faces and bodies bear no resemblance to the ones
their accidents stole away from them, and the effects were
irreversible. The physical and mental pain they endured is unimagi-
nable and strong enough to make them choose death over life.
Although Dax survived the accident and no longer feels physical
pain from the bums, he still believes that the hospital "should have
let him die.",24 Kelly dreamed of being free from his body in the
afterlife, an afterlife he could not enter without the assistance of
another.2 ' Kelly could have committed suicide in a less painful
and more dignified manner if he were allowed to seek the assis-
tance of a physician.
'9 Id. After the explosion Dax ran for almost a mile in an attempt to escape
walls of flames. Id. Eventually he came upon a neighboring farmer. Id. Dax
begged the man to kill him. Id.
20 Id.
2 Id. at 16-17. The only undamaged skin on Dax's body was on the bottom
of his feet, and that was later used for skin grafts. Id. at 16.
22 Id. at 17.
23 Id. at 16. At the time of the accident, Dax was 25 years old. Id. at 15.
Dax is now a leading advocate for the right to die. Id. at 15-16. Even though he
no longer feels pain from the bums themselves, he strongly believes that the
doctors "should have let him die." Id. at 15. After he was released from the
hospital, he attempted to kill himself several times. Id. at 17. He tried to slash
his wrists, overdose on sleeping pills, and jump in front of oncoming traffic. Id.
24 Id. at 15.
21 SHAVELSON, supra note 1, at 121.
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Physician-assisted suicide refers to a patient ending his or her
life with the aid of a doctor who prescribes life-ending medica-
tion.26 Although the practice is illegal in thirty-seven states,27
26 26 CATHLEEN DESIMONE, DEATH ON DEMAND: PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES, LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDES 9 (1996). Physician-
assisted suicide has been described as "active euthanasia" or "voluntary
euthanasia." See infra note 123 (outlining various forms of euthanasia).
27 KevinM. Stansbury, in his articlePhysicianAssistedSuicide-DueProcess,
The Right to Die, Equal Protection and Slippery Slopes, 31 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 623, 637 n.132 (1996) lists the 33 states that have criminalized assisted
suicide: ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100(a)(1)(B) (Michie 1994) (first degree
murder); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-1103(3) (West 1989) (manslaughter); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1993) (manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 401 (West 1993) (separate crime, felony); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3104(1)(b)
(1986) (manslaughter); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56(a)(2) (West 1994)
(manslaughter in the second degree); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1994)
(separate crime, felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1982) (separate crime,
felony); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (1995) (separate crime, felony); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 707-702(1)(b) (1993) (manslaughter); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-31
(West 1995) (separate crime, felony if suicide is successful, misdemeanor if
suicide unsuccessful); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5 (Michie 1994) (separate
crime, felony); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1992) (separate crime, felony);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 204 (West 1993) (separate crime, felony); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 102 (1995) (reckless endangerment); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.215 (West 1994) (separate crime, felony); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.023(2) (1992) (voluntary manslaughter); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49
(1994) (separate crime, felony); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1993) (separate
crime, felony); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1989) (separate crime, felony); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.4 (1994) (separate crime, felony); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C: 11-6 (West 1994) (separate crime, felony); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4
(Michie 1994) (separate crime, felony); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney
1987) (separate crime, felony); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (1993) (separate
crime, felony); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813 (West 1993) (separate crime,
felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (1993) (separate crime, felony if suicide
is successful, misdemeanor if suicide attempt is unsuccessful); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-16-37 (Michie 1993) (separate crime, felony); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-216 (1995) (separate crime, felony); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08
(West 1994) (separate crime, felony if suicide is successful, misdemeanor if
suicide attempt is unsuccessful); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West
1988) (separate crime, felony); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982) (separate
crime, felony).
Since the publication of his Note, four additional states have criminalized
physician-assisted suicide. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707 A.2, 707A.3 (West 1997)
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including California, twenty-three percent of surveyed physicians
in California admitted to assisting patients with ending their
lives.2" Eighty-one percent of those doctors confessed to assisting
more than one patient."
The American public has learned about physician-assisted
suicide as a result of the press Dr. Jack Kevorkian has received.30
"What was once medicine's little secret has been brought to the
forefront of the public consciousness through the work of Dr. Jack
Kevorkian. ' '31 Dr. Kevorkian, who is popularly regarded as a
renegade of the medical profession, is a retired pathologist whose
medical license has been suspended in Michigan and revoked in
California for practicing assisted suicide. 32 Kevorkian uses two
(separate crime, felony); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (Michie 1994)
(separate crime, felony); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027 (West 1992)
(separate crime, felony); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-60-1, 11-60-3 (1997) (separate
crime, felony).
28 JAMES M. HUMBER, PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH 14 (1993). The survey
was conducted in 1987 by the National Hemlock Society. Id. at 13-14. 5,000
California physicians that were members of the American Medical Association
Were surveyed anonymously by mail. Id. at 13. Only 12% of the physicians
surveyed responded. Id. at 14. In 1988, the Center for Health Ethics and Policy
at the University of Colorado conducted a similar survey of all licensed doctors
in Colorado. Id. Thirty-one percent of the 7,095 doctors surveyed responded,
37% of whom admitted to giving life-shortening medication to patients. Id.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Kevorkian Brings Suicide Victim To Hospital, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
11, 1996, at 12 (detailing how Dr. Kevorkian dropped off the deceased body of
Wallace Joseph Spolar at a Detroit hospital, after he assisted the man in
committing suicide); Killer on the Loose; Legislature Can't Allow Kevorkian to
Continue Dispensing Death, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 30, 1996, at A12
(criticizing Dr. Kevorkian's ability to practice assisted suicide without any state
regulations); Phil Mintz, The Kevorkian Files, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 8, 1996, at
A49 (listing personal biographies of the first 38 patients that Dr. Kevorkian
assisted in committing suicide).
" Christopher N. Manning, Note, Live and Let Die?: Physician-Assisted
Suicide and the Right to Die, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 513, 513 (1996).
32 Thomas Maier, Autopsy Reports Raise Red Flag on Kevorkian Crusade
/ Only 9 of His 40 Assisted Suicides Found Terminally IIl, MORNING NEWS TRIB.
(Tacoma Wash.), Sept. 15, 1996, at F2 [hereinafter Maier, Kevorkian Crusade].
In 1991, the Michigan Board of Medicine suspended Dr. Kevorkian's medical
license after he assisted two non-terminal patients with their respective suicides
334
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methods when assisting patients with ending their lives.33 The first
method allows the patient to achieve death via Kevorkian's "suicide
machine. '34 The machine consists of a large frame with two
syringes attached.35 One syringe is filled with the anesthetic
sodium pentothal and the other syringe is filled with a lethal dose
of potassium chloride.36 This method begins by Dr. Kevorkian
inserting an intravenous needle into one of the patient's veins.37
The patient is then responsible for pushing a button that releases
sodium pentothal, putting the patient to sleep.38 Soon after,
potassium chloride is automatically released into the patient's vein,
thus causing his or her death.39 The second method simply
in Michigan. Jim Persels, Commentary, Forcing the Issue of Physician-Assisted
Suicide, Impact of the Kevorkian Case on the Euthanasia Debate, 14 J. LEGAL
MED. 93, 99 (1993). Consequently, Kevorkian was charged with two counts of
murder and one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Id.
However, all charges were later dismissed. Id. In 1994, the California Medical
Board revoked Kevorkian's medical license because he lacked the qualifications
and skills to determine whether his patients were competent when they made the
decision to commit suicide. Maier, Kevorkian Crusade, supra, at F2. The Board
criticized Kevorkian's assistance in the suicide of Marjorie Wantz, a non-terminal
woman that complained of severe pelvic pain, the existence of which could not
be verified. Thomas Maier, Kevorkian 's Claims At Odds With Coroner, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 12, 1996, at Al [hereinafter, Maier, Kevorkian's Claims
At Odds With Coroner].
" See Mintz, supra note 30, at A49; infra notes 34-40 (discussing the
methods used by Dr. Kevorkian). Since 1990, Dr. Jack Kevorkian has assisted
patients committing suicide by either lethal injection or carbon monoxide
poisoning. Mintz, supra note 30, at A49.
14 Mintz, supra note 30, at A49. Dr. Kevorkian built the machine in
September of 1989 and named it the "Mercitron." DR. JACK KEVORKIAN,
PRESCRIPTION: MEDICIDE 209 (1991). Dr. Kevorkian admitted that he constructed
the "Mercitron" on his kitchen table. MICHAEL BETZOLD, APPOINTMENT WITH
DOCTOR DEATH 35 (1993). On June 4, 1990, the first patient to use the
"Mercitron" was Janet Adkins, a woman that was not terminally-ill, but had been
diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease. KEVORKIAN, supra, at 230.
3 Persels, supra note 32, at 97.
36 Persels, supra note 32, at 97.
37 KEVORKIAN, supra note 34, at 208.
38 Persels, supra note 32, at 97.
3 Persels, supra note 32, at 97. The sodium pentothal and the potassium
chloride are released through the same intravenous needle. KEVORKIAN, supra
335
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requires the patient to inhale carbon monoxide through a gas mask
provided by Dr. Kevorkian.40
Kevorkian's methods have stirred up a significant amount of
public debate for two major reasons.4' First, unlike most individu-
als who fear their mortality, he appears to embrace death in an
42almost fanatical manner. Consequently, he has been nicknamed
"Dr. Death., 43 Second, while most of the public may sympathize
with terminal patients expediting their deaths in order to avoid
additional pain and suffering associated with their illnesses,"
note 34, at 208.
40 Mintz, supra note 30, at A49.
4' Kevorkian's work is in direct conflict with both secular and religious laws
which promote the preservation of life and prohibit the practice of suicide. See
MARGARET PABST BATTrN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH 206 (1994) (noting that
Christianity considers suicide to be the greatest sin an individual can commit);
Steve Kloehn, Now Is the Time To Bring Religion Back Into Decisions, Many
Believe, CHIC. TRIB., June 27, 1997, at 19 (discussing how Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam believe that physician-assisted suicide is morally repugnant and
quoting a professor of Islamic Studies as saying that committing physician-
assisted suicide is "like committing a crime in Islam"). See also supra note 27
(listing 37 states that have criminal statutes prohibiting assisted suicide).
42 In addition to supporting physician-assisted suicide, Dr. Kevorkian has
supported medical experimentation on death row inmates, and has recommended
that they be allowed to auction off their organs. Jeff Hooten, A Slippery Slope
to the Real Dr. Death, What Happens When Respectable Doctors Begin Using
Kevorkian's Tactics?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1996, at B7. Some of his experi-
ments have included "transfusing blood from corpses into living patients." Id. At
one time he mixed cadaver blood with his own and used it to paint a picture
frame. Id.
" BETZOLD, supra note 34, at 7. During Dr. Kevorkian's medical residency,
he specifically requested to work the shift during which more patients died, and
he photographed patients' eyes at the moment of their death. BETZOLD, supra
note 34, at 7. As a result of his apparent interest in death, his co-workers
nicknamed him "Dr. Death." Hooten, supra note 42, at B7.
44 "A 1991 Roper Poll/Hemlock Society survey of a representative sample
of 1,500 adults (in California, Oregon, and Washington State) found that 68%
believed that doctors should be legally allowed to assist in the death of a person
who has a painful and distressing terminal disease." HUMBER, supra note 28, at
11-12. That same year, the results of a national poll conducted by the Boston
Globe and Harvard found that 64% favored physician-assisted suicide for
terminal patients. HUMBER, supra note 28, at 12.
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some do not agree with Dr. Kevorkian assisting non-terminal
patients.4"
Dr. Kevorkian (with the assistance of the media) has succeeded
in raising public consciousness and in some cases has evoked
public sympathy for terminal and non-terminal individuals who live
in incurable pain or deteriorate in an undignified manner.46
Consequently, an increasing number of ailing individuals who are
not terminally-ill, nor in the final stages of disease, have sought the
assistance of physicians like Kevorkian in hastening their death.47
4' At their times of death, many of Kevorkian's patients were suffering from
multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer's, Lou Gehrig's disease, or cancer. Mintz, supra
note 30, at A49. However, the overwhelming majority of those patients were not
in the terminal phases of their illnesses at the time of their deaths. Mintz, supra
note 30, at A49. According to the autopsy reports for the first 40 patients Dr.
Kevorkian assisted with committing suicide, only nine were terminal. Maier,
Kevorkian Crusade, supra note 32, at F2. Dr. Nancy Dickey, head of the
American Medical Association's Board of Trustees, believes that Kevorkian's
practice of assisting non-terminal patients with committing suicide forces the
medical community to avoid assisting patients with suicide. Maier, Kevorkian
Crusade, supra note 32, at F2.
46 DEREK HUMPHRY, LAWFUL EXIT 26 (1993). Hemlock Society founder
Derek Humphry admitted that Dr. Kevorkian had successfully illustrated that
some hopelessly ill patients want physician-assisted suicide. Id. However,
Humphry believes that Dr. Kevorkian's conduct is responsible for making it
more difficult for patients to commit physician-assisted suicide. Id. Due to Dr.
Kevorkian's efforts, Humphry argues that physicians that were once willing to
discretely assist patients in hastening death have refrained from acting out of fear
of criminal prosecution. Id. Also, Humphry blames Dr. Kevorkian for provoking
the state of Michigan to enact legislation criminalizing assisted suicide. Id.
" For example, Janet Adkins contacted Dr. Jack Kevorkian after she had
been diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease. KEVORKIAN, supra note 34, at 221-22.
Although Alzheimer's is not a terminal condition, it makes the individual
vulnerable to other illnesses and deteriorates the mind. GEORGE BURNELL, FINAL
CHOICES 319 (1993). Ms. Adkins participated in an experimental program for
treatment of the disease, but, as her conditioned worsened, she became certain
that she wanted to commit suicide. KEVORKIAN, supra note 34, at 222. Sherry
Miller also sought Dr. Kevorkian's services when her multiple sclerosis left her
unable to use her arms and legs. Mintz, supra note 30, at A49. Although multiple
sclerosis is not a terminal condition, it is a degenerative disease of the central
nervous system marked by hardening of tissue in the brain or spinal cord.
WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 463 (1st ed. 1984). With the help
of Dr. Kevorkian, Ms. Miller committed physician-assisted suicide on October
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Even more recently, public debate and interest in physician-
assisted suicide have been heightened by the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Washington v Glucksbeg a8 and Vacco v
Quill.49 Both of these cases were brought by physicians and their
terminally-ill patients who were seeking to commit physician-
assisted suicide. The Court concluded that the New York and
Washington laws that banned assisted suicide were constitu-
tional." However, the Court's decision did not destroy all hope
for the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. In fact, the Court
mentioned that its decision will allow this nation to continue to
debate the legality of physician-assisted suicide." In fact, the State
of Oregon is currently debating whether to uphold its law that
legalized physician-assisted suicide. 2
23, 1991. Mintz, supra note 30, at A49. When Marjorie Wantz suffered from
severe pelvic pain for which doctors could not find a physical cause or cure she
too committed physician-assisted suicide on October 12, 1991. Mintz, supra note
30, at A49.
48 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). In January, 1994,
respondents, three terminally-ill patients, and the nonprofit organization
Compassion in Dying, who counsels patients contemplating physician-assisted
suicide, sued in the United States District Court in the case entitled Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994). The District
Court held that the Washington ban of assisted suicide was unconstitutional. Id.
at 1459. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc and affirmed the
District Court, holding that terminal patients do have a protected liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment in seeking physician-
assisted suicide. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th Cir.
1996). The Due Process Clause provides that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and the
non-profit organization Compassion in Dying was replaced as named respondent
by Harold Glucksberg, M.D., a Washington physician. Thus, hereinafter the case
will be referred to as Glucksberg v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. at 2262.
49 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
So Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2302; Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274.
5' Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274. In his concurrence Justice Souter stated
that "[w]hile I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim should not be
recognized, I acknowledge the legislative institutional competence as the better
one to deal with that claim at this time." Id. at 2293.
52 See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment
of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act and the upcoming referendum).
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In 1994, the state of Oregon passed the Oregon Death With
Dignity Act, a statute legalizing physician-assisted suicide for
terminally-ill patients.53 Simultaneously, other states were cam-
paigning to legalize the practice.14 The fact that Oregon and other
state campaigns limited the right to terminal patients indicates that
if the practice is legalized in other states, its benefits might also be
limited to the terminally-ill." This begs the question of whether
a legal distinction should be drawn between the rights of a terminal
patient and the rights of a non-terminal patient. This Note discusses
why the right to commit physician-assisted suicide has not been
extinguished by the United State Supreme Court's recent decisions
in Quill and Glucksbeig. It then explains why access to assisted
suicide should be expanded to include seriously ill, non-terminal
patients like Kelly and Dax.
Part I of this Note discusses the judicial development of cases
that led the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit to find a constitu-
tional right to physician-assisted suicide for the terminally-ill, both
under a Due Process and an Equal Protection analysis. Part II
addresses the Supreme Court's decision to uphold state laws
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide and discusses its impact upon
future state campaigns to legalize physician-assisted suicide. Part III
compares the similarities between terminally-ill patients and
seriously ill, non-terminal patients seeking physician-assisted
suicide and explains how dissimilar treatment of these two groups
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Part IV explains the problems
which can arise from limiting the right of physician-assisted suicide
to the terminally-ill. Finally, Part V urges state legislators to adopt
statutes which will legalize physician-assisted suicide for termi-
nally-ill and seriously ill, non-terminal patients, and proposes a
model act. This Note concludes that the United State Supreme
Court's decisions in Quill and Glucksberg have not eliminated the
" OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (1994).
54 See infra note 130 (discussing how Washington and California nearly
passed legislation legalizing physician-assisted suicide for the terminally-ill).
15 The Supreme Court in Glucksberg acknowledged that since the Oregon
Death With Dignity Act, numerous proposals have been submitted to state
legislatures which seek to legalize assisted-suicide for the terminally-ill.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2266.
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possibility for legalization of physician-assisted suicide. Instead, it
has left the responsibility for legalizing assisted suicide to individ-
ual state legislatures. This Note predicts that groups and organiza-
tions supporting physician-assisted suicide will revitalize their
legislative campaigns to legalize physician-assisted suicide.
However, it is likely that these groups will propose legislation that
ignores seriously ill, non-terminal individuals who endure physical
pain and suffering equivalent to that experienced by terminal
patients.
I. THE RIGHT To DIE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. The Due Process Clause
In Bouvia v. Superior Court, a 1986 California Court of
Appeals case, the court held that an individual has a right to
commit passive euthanasia and thus laid the foundation for future
judicial battles to legalize physician-assisted suicide.5 6 In Bouvia,
a hospitalized, mentally competent quadriplegic suffering from
severe cerebral palsy, desired to end her life.57 What is significant
in Bouvia is the fact that the patient was not terminally-ill.5 8 She
was a twenty-eight year old woman completely confined to her bed,
who required assistance in feeding, washing, cleaning, toileting,
56 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (2d Dist. 1986). See infra
note 123 (defining "passive euthanasia"). For examples of subsequent judicial
battles, see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(stating that individuals possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir.
1996) (concluding that a New York statute that criminalized assisted suicide was
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment); Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a
liberty interest in hastening one's own death exists).
57 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300. Ms. Bouvia also suffered from degenerative
and severely crippling arthritis which caused her to live in constant pain. Id. at
1136.
" Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 735, 742 (1995).
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turning, and other bodily functions.5 9 Furthermore, she was
intelligent and completely aware of her overwhelming limita-
tions.60 Due to her physical limitations, the only manner in which
she could achieve death was to starve herself. Although she was
able to eat food, spoon-feeding was required.6 When she began
consuming less and less food, the hospital implanted a feeding tube
against Ms. Bouvia's expressed wishes, in order to increase her
consumption and keep her alive.62
In Bouvia, the court recognized that the state's interest in
preserving life did not always outweigh the patient's right to reject
treatment, even when refusing treatment could result in the patient's
death. 63 The court noted that Ms. Bouvia's non-terminal illness
was of little significance when compared to the substandard quality
of life she was living. 64 The court described Ms. Bouvia's life as
follows:
It diminished to the point of hopelessness, uselessness,
unenjoyability and frustration. She, as the patient, lying
helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider
her existence meaningless . . . . Who shall say what the
minimum amount of available life must be? Does it matter
if it be fifteen to twenty years, fifteen to twenty months, or
fifteen to twenty days, if such life has been physically
destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose gone? As in
all matters lines must be drawn at some point, somewhere,
but that decision must ultimately belong to the one whose
life is in issue.65
This decision was the precursor to the United State Supreme
Court's decision in Cruzan v Missouri, Department of Health.66
In Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
59 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
60 Id. See Kamisar, supra note 58, at 742.
6' Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
62 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
63 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
64 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
65 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05.
66 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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refusing unwanted life-saving medical treatment . 7 Nancy Cruzan
was in a serious automobile accident that left her in a persistent
vegetative state. 68 Ms. Cruzan was not terminally ill; she could
have lived for decades with the assistance of artificial feeding and
hydration.69 However, her parents and her doctors were convinced
that she would be unaware of her own existence as long as she
lived.7" Consequently, her parents sought to end her life by
removing her feeding and hydration tubes.7" Before Nancy's life
support could be removed, the State of Missouri required clear and
convincing evidence that Nancy preferred death to artificial
treatment.72
The Court held that a state may impose a requirement of clear
and convincing evidence that a patient would prefer that his or her
life-support systems be removed in order to hasten death.73 Nancy
Cruzan's parents were unable to meet this evidentiary requirement
and consequently were prohibited from removing their daughter's
artificial life support.74 However, the Court's holding recognizes
that an individual possesses a liberty interest in refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment. 75 This was a monumental move
67 Id. at 279.
61 Id. at 266. A person in a persistent vegetative state "exhibits motor
reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive fimction." Id.
69 Id. "Medical experts testified that she could live another thirty years." Id.
70 Id. A body in a vegetative state maintains temperature, heartbeat,
pulmonary ventilation, digestive functions and low levels of conditioned
responses. Id. However, there is no evidence of self-awareness or awareness of
one's surroundings. Id.
71 Id. at 267. When Nancy Cruzan's parents requested that the hospital staff
remove their daughter's artificial treatment, the staff refused to do so without a
court order. Id. The Supreme Court held that close family members of patients
like Nancy Cruzan cannot make the decision to remove life-saving treatment in
substitution of the incompetent patient. Id. at 286. The Court explained that in
Missouri, clear and convincing evidence must exist that proves the patient would
prefer death over life. Id. at 282.
72 Id. at 282.
71 Id. at 284.
74 Id. at 286.
71 Id. at 285.
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forward for proponents of euthanasia.7 6 Cruzan was the first
United States Supreme Court decision acknowledging an individ-
ual's "right to die."" Although the Cruzan Court did not explic-
itly recognize a fundamental right to die,7" its holding lent support
for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Compassion in Dying v
Washington that mentally competent, terminally-ill patients have a
right to physician-assisted suicide.79
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying partially
relied upon Cruzan to extend the right to die to include mentally
competent, terminally-ill individuals who were seeking to hasten
death with a doctor's assistance.8" The plaintiffs in Compassion in
Dying contended that a Washington statute that made it unlawful
to aid someone in committing suicide, prevented terminally-ill
patients from exercising their constitutionally protected liberty
interest in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.8' The Ninth Circuit held that under the Due Process
Clause, there is a "realm of personal liberty" that the government
may not enter.82 Within this realm is the right to control the time
and manner of one's death.83 The court concluded that, because
Cruzan recognized that the right to reject life-sustaining medical
76 George J. Annas, The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering From
Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 875, 883 (1996)
(noting that, at the time, the Cruzan decision was the only "right to die" case that
the Supreme Court had decided).
" Cruzan is no longer the only United State Supreme Court "right to die"
case. On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court decided that a mentally competent,
terminally-ill patient does not have a protected right under the 14th Amendment
to commit physician-assisted suicide. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
" See generally Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
79 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan to recognize an individual's right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment, "necessarily recognizes a liberty interest in
hastening one's own death").
go Id.
8I Id. at 797. The Due Process Clause provides that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
82 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 806 (9th Cir. 1996).
8 Id. at 813.
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treatment is a liberty interest, it follows that an individual also has
"a liberty interest in hastening one's own death., 8 4
The Ninth Circuit also relied upon the Supreme Court's
decision in Planned Parenthood v Casey." In Casey, the Court
concluded that "matters involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment."86 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
stated that the decision to end one's life is perhaps the most
personal and intimate choice a person may make in their lifetime,
and is central to personal dignity and autonomy.87. This decision
therefore, recognizes a liberty interest within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause.88 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit, relying on
both Cruzan and Casey, held that mentally competent, terminally-ill
patients have a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment
to commit physician-assisted suicide.89
The Ninth Circuit's decision was a clear victory for proponents
of physician-assisted suicide. For the first time in history, a court
legitimized an act that had been historically prohibited.9" How-
ever, the victory was short-lived. On June 26, 1997, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's decision. 91 The
Court repudiated the respondent's claim that physician-assisted
suicide falls within the line of substantive-due-process cases in
which personal autonomy and self-control are emphasized.92 In
14 Id. at 816.
8' 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
86 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
87 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813-14.
88 Id. at 813.
89 Id. at 814.
90 See supra note 27 (listing 37 states that criminalize assisted suicide).
' Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2258 (1997) (deciding that the
Washington law that prohibited assisted suicide did not unconstitutionally violate
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment).
92 Id. at 2269. The Court explained how the lower court inappropriately
"transmuted" the fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, which
was established in Cruzan, into a right to commit physician-assisted suicide. Id.
at 2270. The Court further explained that although the Casey decision reaffirmed
the right of a woman to seek an abortion, it does not allow a court to reach the
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fact, the Court stated that its decision in Cruzan was consistent with
this nation's tradition of "protecting the decision to refuse unwan-
ted medical treatment,"93 and was not based upon the principle of
personal autonomy.94 Furthermore, the Court criticized the lower
court's decision for concluding from Casey that "any and all
important, intimate, and personal" choices are protected under the
Due Process Clause.95 The Court thereafter held that the
Washington law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide did not
violate the Due Process Clause.96
"sweeping conclusion" that all personal choices are protected by the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 2271.
9' Id. at 2270.
94 Id. at 2270-71. The Court stated that it did not intend for its decision in
Cruzan to be "transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide." Id.
9' Id. The Court pointed out that its decision in Casey to protect a personal
liberty could not be broadly extended to assisted suicide. Id. at 2271.
96 Id. In determining the constitutionality of the Washington statute, the
Court also had to determine whether the state's ban of physician-assisted suicide
was rationally related to legitimate government interests. Id. at 2271. The
interests asserted by the state included protecting citizens who may choose to
commit suicide while suffering from depression; protecting the integrity of the
medical profession by banning a practice that would blur the "time-honored line
between healing and harming"; and banning a practice that could not be limited
to the terminally-ill if it were legalized. Id. at 2272-74. The Court relied upon
evidence presented by the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law,
which showed that "more than 95% of those who commit suicide had a major
psychiatric illness at the time of death; among the terminally ill, uncontrolled
pain is a 'risk factor' because it contributes to depression." Id. at 2272. The New
York State Task Force asserted that since depression is difficult to diagnose,
patients with untreated pain may become depressed and seek assisted suicide. Id.
at 2273. The state of Washington also asserted that it had an interest in
protecting individuals who may be coerced into committing assisted suicide. Id.
at 2272. Such individuals would include the poor, the elderly and disabled
persons who are susceptible to undue influence. Id. at 2273. The Court also
considered the American Medical Association's Code of Ethics § 2.211 (1994),
which states that a physician's role in assisting suicide would be incompatible
with his or her role as a healer. Id. at 2272. The Court also contemplated the
practice of assisted suicide in the Netherlands where studies have shown that the
procedure has not been limited to the terminally-ill and that abuse of the practice
has lead to the death of vulnerable individuals who never consented to assisted
suicide. Id. at 2273-74. The state also feared situations in which patients would
be physically unable to independently take their lethal medication and conse-
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B. The Equal Protection Clause
In 1996, a group of terminally-ill patients and their doctors
challenged the constitutionality of New York statutes that prohib-
ited assisted suicide.97 In Quill v Vacco, the Second Circuit
concluded that New York's statutes were unconstitutional, but not
because it believed that physician-assisted suicide was a fundamen-
tal right.9 Instead, it held that the statutes prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.99 The court reasoned that the statutes
failed to treat similarly situated persons alike because terminal
patients attached to artificial life-support could end their lives by
removing such support, while terminal patients not attached to life
support could not end their lives by taking a lethal dose of
prescribed medication." Furthermore, the court held that the
State of New York does not have a legitimate interest in distin-
guishing these two classes of people.' '
quently require either physicians, family members or friends to administer the
medication for them. Id. at 2274. The Court concluded that Washington's ban of
physician-assisted suicide was rationally related to its interests. Id. at 2271.
97 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1996). The physicians
alleged that they were prevented from prescribing life-ending medication to
terminal patients for fear of prosecution under New York law. Id. The New York
Penal law states, "[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when
... he intentionally... aids another person to commit suicide." N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1987). The law further states, "a person is guilty of
promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally ... aids another person to
attempt suicide." Id. § 120.30.
9' 80 F.3d at 725. Compare Quill, 80 F.3d at 727 (holding that the New
York statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause by failing to treat similarly
circumstancedpersons alike) with Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that terminally-ill individuals have a
fundamental right to seek physician-assisted suicide).
99 Quill, 80 F.3d at 716. The Equal Protection Clause provides that equal
protection of individuals under the law cannot be denied by any state. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
'0 Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
... Id. at 727. The court stated that there cannot be an interest in preserving
the life of a terminal patient because such a person's life is almost over. Id. at
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As was the Ninth Circuit's decision in Compassion in Dying,
the Second Circuit's decision in Quill was a temporary historical
victory for proponents of physician-assisted suicide. The United
States Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit's decision and
held that there is a distinction between ending one's life by
removing life-saving medical treatment and receiving assistance
from a physician.'0 2 The Court distinguished the acts by consider-
ing both the intent of the physician and the patient's cause of
death.'0 3 The intent of a physician who discontinues a patient's
medical treatment is to respond to a patient's request to stop
treatment that is no longer beneficial to him or her." The cause
of death under such circumstances would be the underlying
illness. 10 5 This differs from a physician who prescribes life-
ending medication. The intent of a physician prescribing life-ending
medication is not to stop ineffective treatment, but rather to ensure
the patient's death. 10 6 Moreover, the cause of death is not the
terminal illness, but rather the prescribed medication. 1 7 Since the
Court established that the two procedures are distinguishable in
terms of "causation and intent," terminally-ill patients may be
treated dissimilarly without violating the Equal Protection
Clause. l0
729. Furthermore, the state cannot legitimately require a terminal patient to
endure prolonged pain and indignity when the inevitable result is death. Id. at
730.
102 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2298 (1997).
103 Id. at 2298.
" Id. The theory that a patient has a right to reject medical treatment has
been based upon the notion of "bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted
touching." Id. at 2301 (quoting Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990)).
10' Id. at 2298.
106 Id.
107 id.
'0' Id. "When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven effects upon
particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern."
(quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
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II. LEGALIZATION OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IS LEFT TO
THE STATES
Although the United States Supreme Court upheld both New
York and Washington's bans on physician-assisted suicide, the
Court's opinions made it clear that it did not eliminate all possibili-
ties for the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. In his majority
opinion in Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed the
Court's desire to steer clear of creating new fundamental rights or
liberty interests under the Due Process Clause since such action
would transform protected liberties into "policy preferences" of the
Court.'0 9 The Court intimated that if it extended constitutional
protection to physician-assisted suicide, it would be usurping the
powers of state legislatures and ignoring public debate over this
controversial issue." Essentially, the Court decided that if the
right to physician-assisted suicide is to be established, it must be
done by a state legislature and not the Court."'
In conducting its Due Process analysis, the Court in Glucksberg
examined this country's "history, legal traditions, and prac-
tices""' and concluded that assisted suicide has no roots in this
nation's history.113 The Court also concluded that if it upheld the
'09 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267-68 (1997) (citing
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1937) (plurality opinion)).
10 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267-68.
.. Ellen Goodman, Assisted Suicide; Court's Decision Leaves Many Legal
Doors Open, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 29, 1997, at 5J (commenting on
how the Supreme Court's decision essentially left the matter to the states to
decide by leaving open enough legal doors "to make the future look like a
hospital hallway").
'1 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262.
13 Id. at 2263-65. The Court pointed out that presently, almost every state
and western democracy criminalizes assisted suicide. Id. at 2263. Furthermore,
"for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or
disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide." Id. The Court asserted that
this nation's disapproval of assisting suicide has been reaffirmed by recent ballot
initiatives in Washington and California where the public voted against legalizing
assisted suicide. Id. at 2266. The Court did acknowledge that the existence of
these ballot initiatives has proved that these states were "engaging in serious,
348
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
lower court's decision and found that access to physician-assisted
suicide was a fundamental right, such a decision would upset
centuries of legal tradition which rejected assisted suicide and
would replace the law of nearly every single state." 4 It appears
that the Court was reluctant to single-handedly change history by
determining that access to physician-assisted suicide is a fundamen-
tal right."5 Seemingly, it would prefer that a majority of each
state's citizenry vote to legalize physician-assisted suicide, rather
than having the Court make one law for the nation. In its final
words, the Court stated that its decision would allow the "debate to
continue as it should in a democratic society... 6 Therefore,
proponents of physician-assisted suicide must now return their
focus to passing state legislation that will legalize assisted sui-
cide."l7
It is feasible that more laws legalizing physician-assisted suicide
will be passed by state legislatures for two reasons. First, advocates
of physician-assisted suicide have experience with introducing
legislation that legalizes such suicide. Second, public support exists
for the practice. Proponents of physician-assisted suicide began
their legislative campaign nearly a century ago. In 1906, the Ohio
legislature proposed a bill before its Committee on Medical
thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide." Id. at 2267.
"'4 Id. at 2269.
"5 Chief Justice Rehnquist's final words in the majority opinion acknowl-
edge that the Court is conscious of the country's ongoing debate over the
"morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide." Id. at 2275.
6 Id. at 2269. It should be noted that debates in a democratic society are
customarily resolved by the opinion of a majority. For example, in the State of
Oregon, the enactment of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, which legalized
physician-assistedsuicide for mentallycompetent,terminally-illpatients, signified
that the majority of Oregon's citizenry shared the opinion that assisted suicide
is a fundamental right. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1994). The Supreme Court
acknowledged that since the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, numerous
proposals have been submitted to state legislatures which seek to legalize
physician-assisted suicide. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2266.
117 Janny Scott, Ruling Against Assisted Suicide Won't Kill 'Right To Die'
Debate, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1997, at A18 (suggesting that, as a result of the
Court's decision in Glucksberg, many states will renew their efforts to legalize
assisted suicide, and predicting that patients will be forced to cross state lines in
order to commit physician-assisted suicide).
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Jurisprudence to allow physicians to ask their mentally competent
patients who were fatally injured, seriously ill or enduring severe
physical pain with an unlikeliness of recovery whether they wanted
to die. 8 If the patient consented, the physician would be
required to confer with three other physicians regarding the
patient's condition."9 If the four physicians agreed that the
patient's "case was hopeless,"' 2 ° the doctors would make arrange-
ments to end the patient's life in the most comfortable manner
possible.' 2' Although the bill was ultimately defeated by the
Committee, its significance is two-fold. 122 First, it signified public
support for euthanasia in the United States. 123 Second, the bill did
not attempt to limit the right to physician-assisted suicide to the
terminally-ill. Instead, it recognized that incurable pain and
suffering may create a hopeless existence for both terminal and
non-terminal patients.
Through the years, proponents of assisted suicide organized
themselves and began introducing more legislation in an attempt to
legalize euthanasia. The Euthanasia Society of America, founded in
1938, was the first American organization to advocate euthana-
sia. 124 It was the Society's directive to "crusade for legalization
of euthanasia on the belief that with adequate safeguards, the choice
118 Persels, supra note 32, at 101.
"9 Persels, supra note 32, at 101.
120 Persels, supra note 32, at 101.
121 Persels, supra note 32, at 101.
122 Persels, supra note 32, at 101 (stating that the bill was defeated by a vote
of 78 to 22).
123 The term "euthanasia" refers to the decisions or actions that induce the
gentle and peaceful death of an individual. JoHN LADD, ETHICAL ISSUES
RELATING TO LIFE AND DEATH 3 (1979). "Passive euthanasia" refers to death
caused by an underlying illness after artificial, life-sustaining treatment has been
removed. Peter M. McGough, M.D., A Symposium: Physician-Assisted Suicide,
Medical Concerns About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
521, 521 (1995). "Active euthanasia" requires one individual taking the life of
another by either lethal injection or medication. Id. It requires "taking steps to
end your life" with the assistance of another person. HUMPHRY, supra note 46,
at 20. Physician-assisted suicide has been categorized as a type of "active
euthanasia." McGough, supra, at 521.
124 Persels, supra note 32, at 101.
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of immediate death rather than prolonged agony should be available
to the dying., 125 On several occasions the Society submitted
proposals to the New York legislature which advocated legalizing
euthanasia. 126 However, each of the legislative proposals failed to
be introduced. 27 Over the years, the size of the Euthanasia
Society increased and new organizations were founded.2 8 This
growth in membership confirms the fact that an increased number
of citizens support assisted suicide.
Further support for physician-assisted suicide is reflected in the
results of a 1996 Gallup poll, which showed that seventy-five
percent of Americans favor physician-assisted suicide. 129 Perhaps
this high approval rating explains why so many states have come
close to legalizing physician-assisted suicide. 130 Public support for
125 Persels, supra note 32, at 101.
126 Persels, supra note 32, at 102 (discussing how the Society attempted to
introduce legislation in New York in 1939, 1947 and 1952).
127 Persels, supra note 32, at 101-02.
128 In 1967, the Euthanasia Society of America formed the Euthanasia
Education Council. Persels, supra note 32, at 102. The Council's goal was to
change public opinion about death, dying and euthanasia. Persels, supra note 32,
at 102. In 1975, the Society changed its name to the Society for the Right to Die
and it began focusing upon self-determination and patient autonomy. Persels,
supra note 32, at 102. In 1980, the California Hemlock Society, which also
advocates for the right to die, was founded. Persels, supra note 32, at 102.
129 See Hooten, supra note 42, at B7. Since 1947 there has been a dramatic
increase in public support for physician-assisted suicide. HUMBER, supra note 28,
at 78 (reporting that in 1947, 37% of those polled supported physician-assisted
suicide compared to 70% in 1991).
130 In 1991, Washington was on the brink of being the first state in the union
to legalize physician-assisted suicide. Stansbury, supra note 27, at 628. The
legislation, entitled Measure 119, would have allowed mentally competent adults
with a proven terminal condition to commit physician-assisted suicide. Stansbury,
supra note 27, at 628. However, voters rejected the legislation by a small
majority, 54 to 46%. Stansbury, supra note 27, at 628. In 1992, California
Proposition 161 proposed the legalization of physician-assisted suicide for the
terminally-ill. Jody B. Gabel, Release From Terminal Suffering? The Impact of
Aids on Medically Assisted Suicide Legislation, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 369, 413
(1994). Coincidentally, California's legislation was also defeated by a 54 to 46%
margin. Catherine M. Larson, A Commentary on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 9
UTAH B.J. 8, 10 (1996). In 1993, Senator Pamela Cahill of Maine introduced
"An Act Concerning the Terminally II," which proposed the legalization of
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physician-assisted suicide manifested itself in 1994 when a majority
of Oregon's voters approved the Oregon Death With Dignity
Act."13 The Act allowed mentally competent, terminally-ill
citizens to make written requests for lethal prescriptions from a
licensed physician.' Fifteen days before the Act was to take
effect, the Oregon statute was successfully challenged by four
terminally-ill individuals, their physicians, residential care facilities,
and facility owners opposed to physician-assisted suicide.'33 As
physician-assisted suicide. Gabel, supra, at 415. However, it was rejectedby both
the Maine Senate Judiciary Committee and the Maine House of Representatives.
Gabel, supra, at 415. The Colorado "Dignity in Death Act" was introduced in
January 1996. Stansbury, supra note 27, at 630-31. If passed, it would have
allowed terminally-ill patients to request a life-ending prescription from a
physician. Stansbury, supra note 27, at 630-31. However, the Act was defeated
in the Health, Environment, Welfare and Institutions Committee of the Colorado
House. Stansbury, supra note 27, at 630-31.
131 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (1994). The Act allows terminally-
ill residents from the State of Oregon, to make a written request for lethal
medication for the purpose of ending his or her life "in a humane and dignified
manner." Id. § 127.805. The request must be signed and dated by the patient, and
witnessed by two unrelated and uninterested individuals who attest to the
voluntariness of the patient's signature. Id. § 127.810. Both an attending and
consulting physician must meet with the patient and confirm that he or she is
mentally competent, suffering from a terminal disease, and has made the request
voluntarily. Id. §§ 127.815, 127.820. The attending physician must also inform
the patient of alternatives to physician-assisted suicide. Id. § 127.815.
132 Id. § 127.805.
133 Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), vacated, Lee v.
Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). The Oregon District Court found that the
Act was unconstitutional for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment because it failed to provide the terminally-ill the same protection
against suicide that the majority of citizens possess. Id. See Maureen M. Devlin,
J.D., Lee v. State of Oregon, 11 IssuEs L. & MED. 433, 433-34 (1996). The
statute contained inadequate safeguards which included the allowance of
physicians to use a "good faith" standard of care, a much lower standard than
"ordinary diligence." Lee, 891 F. Supp at 1436-37. Such a low standard would
allow a physician to "negligently misdiagnose a person's condition and
competency and negligently prescribe a drug overdose, so long as those actions
are in good faith." Id. at 1437. Also, Oregon's Act failed to provide mental and
social evaluations by trained professionals that would identify mental disorders
and would protect patients from coercion by third parties. Id. at 1436. Finally,
the Act lacked appropriate supervision at the time of death. Id. at 1438. In sum,
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a result, the Oregon District Court permanently enjoined the Act
from taking effect. 34 However, the District Court's decision was
ultimately vacated by the Ninth Circuit based upon its finding that
the plaintiffs lacked standing for their claims. 35 The State of
Oregon is preparing for a referendum in which the citizens will
determine whether to uphold the Act.
136
At its origins, the legislative battle for physician-assisted suicide
was fought for terminally-ill and seriously ill, non-terminal patients.
However, as the foregoing illustrates, the interest in securing
similar rights for seriously ill, non-terminal patients has vanished.
Since 1906, all proposed legislation advocating a right to physician-
the court found that these inadequate safeguards did not further any legitimate
state interests. Id. at 1437.
134 Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995) (declaring that the
Oregon Death With Dignity Act violates the 14th Amendment of the Constitution
and consequently a permanent injunction shall immediately take effect).
"' Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). The terminally-ill
plaintiffs claimed that if they sought physician-assisted suicide under the terms
of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, the Act's inadequate safeguards would
probably cause them to take their own lives against their will. Id. at 1388. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that such reasoning would require it to assume that the
plaintiffs would eventually become depressed to the point of being either unable
to make an informed decision or unduly influenced by a third party. Id. It would
also require the court to assume that the plaintiffs would request physician-
assisted suicide and that the attending and consulting physicians would
misdiagnose them as being competent to make the decision. Id. For the court to
assume that this chain of events would occur is "conjectural and hypothetical"
at best. Id. Consequently, the plaintiffs failed to assert an "injury in fact" and
therefore lacked standing. Id. The other plaintiffs included a physician, residential
care facilities, and owners and administrators of residential care facilities. Id. at
1391. The court concluded that these plaintiffs claims lacked standing and
ripeness because the Act would not penalize them if they failed to abide by its
provisions. Id. Since these plaintiffs did not allege a "concrete and particularized
injury," their claims were dismissed. Id.
136 Assisted-Suicide Law in Oregon Again Faces Vote; Referendum on
Repeal Bid Scheduled For Nov. 4, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 30, 1997, at 3A. The
Catholic Church as well as anti-abortion groups have pressured the Oregon
legislature to hold a referendum on November 4, 1997 in which the state's
citizenry will be forced to reconsider whether physician-assisted suicide should
be legalized. Id. The ballot will be mailed to residents during mid-October.
Measure 51 Campaign, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 15, 1997, at A9.
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assisted suicide has excluded seriously ill, non-terminal patients.
The enactment of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act was a major
accomplishment for proponents of physician-assisted suicide. It
represents the future pathway for the legalization of such suicide.
However, the Act's failure to include non-terminal patients within
its purview suggests that this class of individuals has been ignored
in the legislative forum. As the following will show, the similarities
between terminally-ill patients and seriously ill, non-terminal
patients may make it constitutionally impermissible to limit the
right to physician-assisted to terminal patients.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF STATE LEGISLATION
LEGALIZING ASSISTED SUICIDE
As demonstrated by Oregon's Death With Dignity Act, 137
when states succeed in passing legislation that legalizes physician-
assisted suicide, it is likely that the right will only exist for
mentally competent, terminally-ill patients.1 38 However, it is
probable that such a limitation will be constitutionally challenged
by seriously ill, non-terminal patients like Kelly Niles and Dax
Cowert, 139 alleging that such a limited right violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, if two groups of individuals
are similarly situated, they must receive equal treatment under the
law.140 Both seriously ill, non-terminal patients and terminally-ill
13' OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (1994) (stating that only adult residents of
Oregon who are suffering from a terminal disease may request lethal medication
for the "purpose of ending his or her life"). The Act defines terminal disease as
"an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will,
within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six (6) months." Id.
§ 127.800.
138 See supra Part II (discussing how recent legislative proposals legalizing
physician-assisted suicide have limited the right to the terminally-ill).
'9 See supra notes 1-25 and accompanying text (discussing the plight of
both Kelly Niles and Dax Cowert). See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258, 2274 (1997) (stating that if physician-assisted suicide is protected as a
constitutional right, it will be impossible to deny citizens who are not terminally-
ill from committing physician-assisted suicide).
140 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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patients are similar in that both groups share an unimaginable
amount of pain and indignity caused by their illnesses. More
importantly, both groups share the desire to avoid their suffering by
committing physician-assisted suicide. However, one distinguishing
characteristic is that seriously ill, non-terminal patients are forced
to live in excruciating mental and physical pain for longer periods
of time.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Compassion in Dying included
descriptions of the debilitating pain that each of the three termi-
nally-ill plaintiffs endured.14' Jane Roe, one of the three termi-
nally-ill patients, was a sixty-nine-year-old pediatrician whose
cancer had "metastasized throughout her skeleton. ' ' 141 She was
bedridden for several years and lived in constant pain that was
heightened by any attempt to move. 43 In addition, Jane Roe
suffered from "bed sores, poor appetite, nausea and vomiting,
impaired vision, incontinence of bowel and general weakness."'"
John Doe, the second patient described by the court, was dying
of AIDS. "4 He lost his sight, 46 had pneumonia twice, and
suffered from chronic, severe skin and sinus infections, grand mal
seizures and extreme fatigue. 147 The third patient, James Poe,
suffered from the constant sensation of suffocating as a result of
emphysema. 48 He also suffered from pulmonary disease, which
prevented the flow of blood to his extremities causing severe leg
141 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 794-95 (9th Cir.
1996).
142 Id. at 794.
"'3 Id. Although she took medication for her pain, it did not successfully
alleviate it. Id.
144 id.
141 Id. AIDS is the acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.
146 Id. John Doe suffered from a condition normally associated with the
AIDS virus called cytomegalovirus retinitis. Id. This condition would eventually
blind Mr. Doe and thus, render him unable to continue painting as an artist. Id.
147 Id.
141 Id. John Poe was attached to an oxygen tank and took morphine in order
to reduce the anxiety he felt from the perpetual feeling of asphyxia. Id.
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pain. 49 The Ninth Circuit recognized that all three patients lived
with terrible pain and suffering while they were alive."50
However, non-terminal patients that are seriously ill are doomed
to an intolerable existence for a prolonged period and consequently
deserve the same recognition as terminally-ill patients. 5' If the
terminally-ill are deemed to possess a right to commit physician-
assisted suicide in order to avoid a few weeks or months of a
reprehensible existence, seriously ill, non-terminal patients certainly
cannot be expected to survive in a similar condition for many
years. 5 2 Take for example Kelly Niles or Dax Cowert, or the
"mangled survivor of a road accident,"' 53 a quadriplegic, an
Alzheimer's patient anticipating their mental deterioration, a cancer
patient or someone suffering in the preliminary stages of AIDS.
Unlike terminally-ill patients, none of these people can rely on
dying as a result of their physical ailment within the next six
months. 5 4 Nor can they rely upon a doctor to prescribe life-
ending medication.'55 Seriously ill, non-terminal patients are left
149 Id.
"' Id. The three terminally-ill plaintiffs died before the court's final
decision. Id.
"'1 "If personal autonomy and the termination of suffering are supposed to
be the touchstones for physician-assisted suicide, why exclude those with non-
terminal illnesses or disabilities who might have to endure greater pain and
suffering for much longer periods of time" than terminally-ill patients who are
"expected to die in the next few weeks or months?" Kamisar, supra note 58, at
740.
152 See Kamisar, supra note 58, at 740-41.
... Kamisar, supra note 58, at 740.
154 See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800, 127.805 (1994) (limiting eligibility for
physician-assisted suicide to the terminally-ill, who are defined as individuals
suffering from incurable diseases that will cause their death within the next six
months).
155 Furthermore, as demonstrated by the Oregon Death With Dignity Act,
once states legalize physician-assisted suicide, they will provide safeguards to
protect terminally-ill patients from hasty decision making or coercion. See OR.
REV. STAT. § 127.815 and § 127.820 (1994) (requiring that both an attending
physician as well as a consulting physician confirm that a patient is suffering
from a terminal illness, that the patient is capable of making the decision to end
his or her life, and has made the decision voluntarily). If either physician
determines that the patient's reasoning is impaired by a psychiatric or psycholog-
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to fend for themselves even though they live with the same pain
and suffering as terminal patients.
IV THE REPERCUSSIONS OF PREVENTING SERIOUSLY ILL,
NON-TERMINAL PATIENTS FROM LEGALLY COMMITTING
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
The legalization of physician-assisted suicide for the terminally-
ill will lead to the implementation of adequate safeguards to ensure
that patients are both competent and informed. 5 6 However,
seriously ill, non-terminal patients will still be left to fend for
themselves. Similar to "back-alley abortions," "back of the van
assisted-suicides" will be a non-terminal patient's alternative. 57
Whether in the back of a van or elsewhere, non-terminal patients
will nevertheless find doctors willing to help them hasten
death. 158 For example, physicians like Dr. Kevorkian have been
assisting non-terminal patients commit assisted suicide, although the
practice is illegal in most states.159 This is problematic since these
ical disorder, or depression, the physician must refer the patient for counseling.
The physicians may not prescribe any medication until the counselor determines
that the patient is not suffering from any form of psychological disorder that
would interfere with the patient's judgment. Id. § 127.825. The Act only allows
patients who have made an informed decision to receive a prescription for
medication. Id. § 127.830. An informed patient is defined as an individual who
has been instructed by his or her attending physician of his or her medical
diagnosis, prognosis, potential risks and probable result associatedwith taking the
medication, and alternatives to physician-assisted suicide. Id. § 127.800(7). The
Act also contains a mandatory fifteen day waiting period which enables a patient
to reflect upon his or her decision and prevents hasty decision making. Id.
§ 127.850. Finally, the Act requires the Health Division to annually review the
records maintained in compliance with the Act. Id. § 127.865.
156 See supra note 155 (discussing the various safeguards within the Oregon
Death With Dignity Act).
157 Dr. Kevorkian assisted some patients end their lives in the back of his
1968 Volkswagen camper van. Mintz, supra note 30, at A49.
158 See HUMBER, supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing surveys
in which physicians in California admitted to assisting patients commit suicide).
159 See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (describing methods Dr.
Kevorkian employs when assisting patients commit suicide); supra note 27
(listing 37 states in which assisted suicide is illegal).
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doctors are not obligated to screen their patients in order to ensure
that patients are mentally competent and suffer from a severe physi-
cal illness. The lack of adequate safeguards has already led to
irreversible mistakes. 160
For example, Rebecca Badger, Marjorie Wantz, and Judith
Curren are three victims of Kevorkian's sloppy procedures. 16 1 Ms.
Badger complained of pain from multiple sclerosis. 62 However,
her neurologist had only given her a tentative diagnosis in
1988, 163 and the coroner found no sign of multiple sclerosis in
her body.'64 Marjorie Wantz complained of severe pelvic pain for
years. 165 Again, the coroner found no physical ailment which
could have caused her "phantom pain. 166
Finally, Kevorkian was sharply criticized for assisting in the
death of Mrs. Judith Curren. 67 Mrs. Curren was not terminally-
ill, but suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome, generally a
treatable condition. 68 Mrs. Curren was also suffering from
160 See Timothy Quill & Betty Rollin, Dr. Kevorkian 's Quick-Fix Death
Store, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 3, 1996, at 9 (discussing the inadequacy of Dr.
Kevorkian's screening process because he only requires a satisfactory response
to the three following questions: (1) is there any trouble in the family; (2) are
there any squabbles over money; (3) do you have a will). See Maier, supra note
32, at F2 (discussing how Dr. Kevorkian's screening process has been criticized
for failing to thoroughly review the patient's medical, psychiatric and family
history; according to Dr. Kevorkian's outspoken legal representative Geoffrey
Fieger, Kevorkian requires that his patients have no possibility of a cure for their
ailment, all family members must be notified of the patient's decision and the
patient must not appear as if she is changing her mind).
16' News Report Questions 3 Kevorkian Suicides, Autopsies Indicated No
Signs of Physical Disease, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 14, 1996, at 5A.
162 Id.
163 Id. Dr. Michael Stein stated that "she was diagnosed as possibly having
multiple sclerosis." Id.
'64 Maier, Kevorkian's Claims At Odds With Coroner, supra note 32, at Al.
165 News Report Questions 3 Kevorkian Suicides, Autopsies Indicated No
Signs of Physical Disease, supra note 161, at 5A.
166 News Report Questions 3 Kevorkian Suicides, Autopsies Indicated No
Signs of Physical Disease, supra note 161, at 5A.
167 Bob Sisson, Ailing Woman Opposes Certain Assisted Suicides,
COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), Sept. 4, 1996, at Cl.
168 Id. Chronic fatigue syndrome is "characterized by an acute or gradual
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fibromyalgia, which is a form of rheumatism with flu-like symp-
toms. 169 Finally, Mrs. Curren was seriously overweight; at five
foot one she weighed 260 pounds.'7 It is questionable whether
Dr. Kevorkian should have assisted Mrs. Curren in committing
suicide because she was not seriously ill. Ethicists have argued, that
as a former doctor, Kevorkian had an ethical duty to ensure that his
patient had no other alternative to death. 171
However, Mrs. Curren's death became even more complicated.
An autopsy revealed that she had multiple drugs in her system,
indicating that she may have been addicted to pain killers. 172 In
addition, she was having serious marital problems. 73 Only twenty
days before her suicide, her husband was arrested for assaulting
her.174 However, Kevorkian denies knowing anything about Mrs.
onset of mononucleosis-like symptoms." David Lipkin, A Troubling Death, CHIC.
TRIB., Sept. 7, 1996, at N23. "It is not a derivative of depression," and its
symptoms include "fevers, night sweats, sudden onset, exercise intolerance and
lymph node swelling." Id. It is a disease that has occasional spontaneous
remissions. Id.
169 Sisson, supra note 167, at Cl. Fibromyalgia causes achy feelings and
shooting pains to the extremities. Sisson, supra note 167, at Cl.
170 Kevorkian Suicide Role A Mistake, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 21,
1996, at 3A.
171 Carol Jouzaitis, New Scrutiny For Kevorkian as Ethicists Question a Case
Last Week, He Assists in Two More Suicides, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 1996, at NI.
Ethics experts have asserted that Mrs. Curren's death underscored the need for
legal or professional standards for doctors such as Kevorkian to follow when
screening candidates for physician-assisted suicide. Id.
172 Perri Peltz, Judith Curren, Dr. Jack Kevorkian "s 25th Assisted Suicide,
NBC NEWS, (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1996).
"' See Kevorkian Suicide Client Reportedly Discussed Suing Spouse,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 24, 1996, at 6A (noting that Judith Curren filed criminal
charges against her husband, a psychiatrist, for physical abuse and considered
bringing a civil suit against him for psychiatric malpractice). Over the course of
seven years, the police had been called into the Curren home at least nine times
to interrupt "loud fights." Jouzaitis, supra note 171, at NI.
174 Jouzaitis, supra note 171, at N1.
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Curren's turbulent home life. 175 He said he assisted her because
she was incurably ill.
176
The case of Judith Curren illustrates the need for a screening
process that ensures the mental competency of patients seeking
physician-assisted suicide. In order to achieve that goal, one
alternative is to draft thoughtful legislation that considers the plight
of seriously ill, non-terminal patients. Since seriously ill, non-
terminal patients are similar to terminal patients seeking physician-
assisted suicide, both groups warrant equal protection under the
law. In this case, equal protection includes legislation that imposes
an obligation upon physicians to ensure that their patients are
incurable, seriously ill, mentally competent, and not making a hasty
or coerced decision. Without such legislation, women like Rebecca
Badger, Marjorie Wantz and Judith Curren will continue to lose
their lives at the hands of doctors like Jack Kevorkian.
V LEGISLATION FOR SERIOUSLY ILL, NON-TERMINAL PATIENTS
SEEKING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Although the United States Supreme Court held that physician-
assisted suicide is not a fundamental right, state legislatures like
Oregon will continue to propose legislation legalizing physician-
assisted suicide for the terminally-ill. Therefore, state legislatures
must enact statutes similar to the Oregon Death With Dignity Act,
but with two distinguishable differences. First, the legislation
cannot limit the right to physician-assisted suicide to terminal
patients. Instead it must extend the right to include non-terminal
patients. Second, such legislation should contain adequate safe-
guards for terminal and non-terminal patients in order to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.17
7
... Jouzaitis, supra note 171, at N 1. Dr. Kevorkian claimed that he learned
of Mrs. Curren's troublesome home life only after her death. Jouzaitis, supra
note 171, at N1.
176 Jouzaitis, supra note 171, at NI.
177 For example, in Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995),
vacated, Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997) the District Court held
that the Oregon Death With Dignity Act violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The court reasoned that the violation was a result of inadequate safeguards that
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Under the proposed Act, a patient must make a written request
for a lethal dose of medication from a physician. After such patient
has made her request, a state appointed panel consisting of one
general practitioner and two doctors specializing in the patient's
condition will meet with and examine the patient. These doctors
must describe every step of the procedure to the patient so that she
is capable of making a fully informed decision. These doctors will
also be required to discuss her case among one another and confirm
the existence of the candidate's physical illness and presence of
pain. The doctors must consider the patient's inability to perform
daily activities as a consequence of her pain, paralysis or other
similar condition. They must also concur upon the degree and
severity of the patient's pain and indignity. Furthermore, they will
consider whether any reasonable alternatives to death are advisable.
Finally, they will determine whether the patient's condition is
serious enough for assisted suicide to be an option.
Simultaneously, one psychiatrist will meet with the patient on
a daily basis for a period of at least seven days to determine
whether the patient is mentally competent to make the decision to
die. A competent individual is someone that is able to independ-
ently decide to end one's life with the assistance of a physician
without undue influence resulting from depression, coercion from
third parties or pressure resulting from financial difficulties
covering medical costs. The psychiatrist will also be required to
advise the patient of alternatives to death.
Upon the filing of the patient's request for physician-assisted
suicide, the panel will have access to any past or present criminal
or civil proceedings filed by or against the patient in order to
ensure that the patient's desire to commit physician-assisted suicide
is not influenced by either domestic violence, physical coercion or
financial insolvency.
If the panel of doctors and the psychiatrist unanimously decide
that such patient is a likely candidate for assisted suicide, they will
failed to provide terminally-ill individuals the same protection from suicide that
the majority of citizens possess. Although the District Court's decision was
vacated based upon the plaintiff's lack of standing, the lower court's decision
highlights the problems with the Act. Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.
1997).
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notify the patient and discuss the procedure, and its consequences
in depth with her. If the patient is still adamant about committing
suicide, the general practitioner will prescribe a lethal dose of
medication. While the patient ingests the medication, the general
practitioner and the psychiatrist must be present with two other
neutral parties to ensure the patient takes the medication voluntarily
and properly.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of physician-assisted suicide is to allow seriously
ill individuals to avoid the prolonged pain and indignity that is
associated with their illnesses. Pain and indignity are not character-
istics exclusive to diseases in their terminal stages. It appears as if
physician-assisted suicide will be legalized through state legislation.
However, only terminally-ill patients will be allowed to practice it.
The consequence of this is two-fold. First, it will foster an
atmosphere in which individuals will have to take matters into their
own hands. Consequently, individuals will be assisted in hastening
death without proper safeguards. Secondly, such legislation will be
violative of the Equal Protection Clause because terminally-ill
patients are the same in fact as seriously ill, non-terminal patients,
and consequently merit equal protection in the eyes of the law. In
order to avoid such results, legislation must be enacted that affords
seriously ill, non-terminal patients the right to commit physician-
assisted suicide.
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